


01223

1962/11/19

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET



52

Orig

SS

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS NIACT 2645
Amembassy BONN NIACT 1203

EXCOM

Distrib-
ution

INFO: Amembassy LONDON NIACT 2673

~~SECRET~~ LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED by *8/4/62* DATE *11/27/90*
() REFERENCE () DECLASSIFY
() INDEX () DECLASSIFY in PART
(X) DEFT () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions *ch* TS authority
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OAI

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TS subject to
() C, OAI
() DOWNGRADE TS to
() CLASSIFY as

with Macmillan.

BEGIN TEXT

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the

situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it.

I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove

Drafted by: EUR:WRIyer:mt
11/19/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U. Alexis Johnson

Clearance:

White House/Br. Andy

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

10/3/67
72000000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *McLank* DATE *1/27/90*

() DECLASSIFY in PART
() DEFT () Non-responsive info
FOI, EO or PA exemptions

SECRET

the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary to focus attention upon this Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the understanding. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called this week so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the Resolution of October 23rd, which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed force.

Meanwhile, we are considering further actions, which may involve response from the air to any attack on our surveillance, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, ~~and~~ since these are

SECRET

SECRET

directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because Soviet missiles are no longer operational in Cuba. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ground combat units, with a total strength of perhaps 3,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12 to 16 thousand men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I expect to indicate clearly Tuesday that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards. Our precise choices among the

SECRET

SECRET

numerous courses of action available to us will evidently be affected by what the Soviets and Cubans actually do.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem. END TEXT

END

RUSK

SECRET